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ARTICLES
POLICE TRESPASS AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A WALL IN NEED OF
MENDING
CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN*
In Robert Frost's poem "Mending Wall,"' the narrator and his
neighbor are repairing the stone walls that separate their farms. The
neighbor insists on mending the wall even where there is no need for
one, explaining, "Good fences make good neighbors." The narrator
muses, "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know/ What I was walling in
or walling out. . . ." The neighbor simply repeats, "Good fences
make good neighbors."2
When police officers suspect that a wall or fence has been er-
ected primarily to wall them out, they sometimes decline to be
"good neighbors." The question then arises whether an unlawful
trespass by law enforcement officials also constitutes an unlawful
search forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.3 Four times since 1983,
the Supreme Court has devoted substantial discussion to the related
questions of what kind of property the Fourth Amendment protects
from physical police intrusion, and what kind of fence or wall is
needed to secure such protection. In Oliver v. United States,' police
officials trespassed on fenced and posted rural farmland to discover
marijuana being cultivated in an open field. In United States v.
* Professor of law, The Catholic University of America Law School. A.B., Uni-
versity of Rochester, 1966; J.D., Columbia University, 1969. Professor Fishman was
formerly an Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney's
Office, and Executive Assistant District Attorney in New York City's Special Narcot-
ics Prosecutor's Office. In 1984-1986, he served as a consultant to the President's
Commission on Organized Crime.
1. THE COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 47 (1949).
2. Id. at 48.
3. See infra text accompanying note 8 for the provisions of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The author wishes readers to note that the "Fourth Amendment" is capitalized
throughout this article in proud defiance of any published citation guidelines.
4. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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Dunn,5 agents climbed over several fences and gates, peered into the
screened-off entrance to a barn, and observed an illicit drug lab. In
both cases, the Court concluded that no fourth amendment violation
had taken place. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,6 investiga-
tors conducted aerial surveillance of a 2,000 acre industrial complex.
Likewise, in California v. Ciraolo,7 investigators conducted aerial
surveillance of a suburban backyard surrounded by a ten-foot-high
fence. In upholding the constitutionality of the surveillance in each
case, the Court commented extensively on what kind of fence might
be required to erect a constitutional barrier to police intrusion.
Thus, these cases have significant privacy implications in a wide va-
riety of contexts: a clearing in a woods a mile from any structure
(Oliver), the entrance to a barn a few dozen yards from a residence
(Dunn), suburban homes (Ciraolo) and commercial property (Dunn
and Dow).
Part I of this article provides an overview of basic Fourth
Amendment principles. Part II analyzes the Oliver and Ciraolo cases
which define and distinguish residential "curtilage," protected by
the Fourth Amendment, and "open fields," which the Fourth
Amendment does not protect. Part III reviews the Dow decision's
discussion of whether an industrial facility, like a residence, might
have constitutionally protected curtilage. Part IV focuses on the
Dunn decision, which dramatizes the curtilage-open field dichotomy
while at the same time blurring the line between the two. Finally,
part V shows how these decisions may have invalidated the "com-
mercial curtilage" concept without squarely discussing it, and may
even permit police officers to conduct surreptitious surveillance of a
home from its front lawn or back yard.
I. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure, in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
Judicial interpretation and application of the amendment are
broadly summarized as follows: "searches and seizures" are lawful
only if authorized in advance by a judicially-issued warrant, based
on facts that establish probable cause to believe that specific evi-
5. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
6. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
7. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
8. U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
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dence of crime will be found in "the place to be searched."' If evi-
dence is obtained in a manner which violates a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights, the prosecutor is not permitted to utilize that
evidence at trial to establish the defendant's guilt.10 This principle,
known as the "Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule," is intended to
deter law enforcement officials from conducting unlawful searches
and seizures by depriving them of the incentive to do so."
Because the Fourth Amendment only protects a person against
"unreasonable searches and seizures," a defendant may attempt to
challenge the method police or prosecution use to obtain evidence
only if he can first show that the authorities obtained that evidence
by conducting either a "search" or a "seizure." ' Thus a defendant
may win suppression of the fruits of a police trespass onto his prop-
erty only if that trespass amounted to an "unreasonable search" as
that term is defined in Fourth Amendment caselaw.
Until 1967, the Supreme Court had consistently held that police
investigative conduct did not constitute a "search" unless that con-
duct physically invaded a defendant's premises, property or posses-
sions. 3 In Katz v. United States,'4 however, the Supreme Court
9. "Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, though the Court has
recognized a few limited exceptions to this general rule." United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 716-17 (1984). In certain circumstances, however, searches and seizures are
lawful even if no warrant has been obtained, so long as probable cause existed at the
time the search or seizure was conducted. Such is the law governing searches of auto-
mobiles. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (under "automobile excep-
tion," warrantless search is not unreasonable if search is based on objective facts that
would justify issuance of warrant). Similarly, police may lawfully search private
premises without a warrant in exigent circumstances. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967). In other circumstances, searches and seizures are lawful even in the ab-
sence of probable cause, so long as a "reasonable suspicion" of wrongdoing existed at
the time of the search. For example, police may temporarily stop and detain ("seize")
an individual for investigation without either a warrant or probable cause, so long as
reasonable suspicion exists to believe that the individual may be involved in criminal
activity. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). If the officer also has a reasonable
suspicion that the person he seeks to stop and question is armed, the officer may also
conduct a superficial frisk ("search") of the individual. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
11. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-47 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268, 275-76 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-59 n.35 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-68. In Mapp, the Court emphasized other purposes for
the rule as well, including "the imperative of judicial integrity." Id. at 659. More
recently, however, the Court has stressed the deterrent rationale as the primary justi-
fication for the rule. Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
13. Under this view, neither wiretapping nor bugging constituted a search, so
long as investigators managed to avoid such a physical invasion. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 441 (1928) (wiretapping); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (bugging).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Government agents placed a listening device on the
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emphasized:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected. 5
But while "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
the real question, as Justice Harlan stressed in his concurring opin-
ion, is "what protection [the Fourth Amendment] affords to those
people.""8 Justice Harlan reasoned that Fourth Amendment protec-
tion exists only if two conditions exist: "first[,] that a person ha[s]
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 
"17
Justice Harlan's formula has since been endorsed by the Court
as the basic definition of the rights which the fourth amendment
protects.1" Thus, if a defendant seeks to suppress evidence or infor-
mation obtained by a law enforcement official, he must first estab-
lish that the official engaged in conduct which intruded upon his
reasonable (or "legitimate," or "justifiable") expectation of privacy.
If the defendant can establish that there was in fact such an intru-
sion, a fourth amendment search has occurred, and the defendant is
entitled to challenge the legality of that search. If, however, the de-
fendant is unable to establish that the investigators' conduct in-
outside of a public telephone booth, used the device to overhear what Katz said dur-
ing two telephone conversations, and then testified as to what they heard at Katz's
trial. Id. at 348-49. The litigants had argued the case before the Supreme Court in
terms of whether a telephone booth was a "constitutionally protected area" and
whether actual physical penetration into such an area was a prerequisite to the appli-
cation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 350-51. The Court "decline[d] to adopt this
formulation of the issues." Id. at 350.
15. Id. at 351-52. Although the agents had probable cause to believe that Katz's
conversations would be incriminating and that they acted with restraint by listening
only when Katz was in the booth, the Court suppressed the agents' testimony as to
what Katz said because the agents had failed to obtain a warrant authorizing the use
of the listening device. Id. at 356-57.
16. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979) ("Consistently
with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,'
a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by gov-
ernment action" (quoting Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz)). See also
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978) (stating that while a person may
have a justified subjective expectation of privacy, it may not be one that the law
recognizes as legitimate); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (stating that the difficulty with applying the principles announced in Katz
arises when determining what expectations of privacy are constitutionally justifiable).
See generally Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76
MIcH. L. REV. 154 (1977).
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truded upon his reasonable expectation of privacy, then no "search"
has occurred, and the defendant is not entitled to have the manner
in which the evidence or information was obtained measured against
fourth amendment standards. 9
How then, does one assess whether an expectation of privacy is
"legitimate?" No definitive answer has yet emerged, but the Court
discussed the question rather extensively in Rakas v. Illinois:20
[I]t would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion
that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend pri-
marily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Le-
gitimation of expectations of privacy must have a source outside the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or per-
sonal property law or to understandings that are recognized and per-
mitted by society.2
While expectations of privacy "need not be based on a common-law
interest in real or personal property," the fact that a property inter-
est does exist "may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the
premises or activity conducted thereon. 22 In particular, the Court
has held that the related concepts of "knowing exposure" and "as-
sumption of risk" significantly limit the scope of the term "search"
and the application of the exclusionary rule.
A. "Knowing Exposure"
The Court in Katz observed that "what a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. '2 If a person knowingly exposes
information or conduct to the public, he is deprived of any reasona-
ble expectation of privacy he may otherwise have had with regard to
that information or conduct; hence, surveillance of that conduct or
acquisition of that information by the police will not be considered
to be a fourth amendment search.2 4 "The Fourth Amendment pro-
tection of the home," for example, "has never been extended to re-
quire law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a
19. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (exposing sus-
pected drug courier's suitcase to a trained narcotics dog does not constitute a
"search," because it reveals only whether the suitcase contains contraband); United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) ("A chemical test that merely discloses
whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy" and therefore is not "characterize[d] ... as a search").
20. 439 U.S. 128 (1979).
21. Id. at 143-44 n.12.
22. Id.
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
24. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-23 (1986). See also Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) ("What is observable by the public [may also be
observed] without a warrant by [a] Government inspector.")
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home on public thoroughfares.""9 Inevitably, issues arise as to the
extent to which conduct or conditions need be exposed, and the de-
gree of knowledge of that exposure necessary to bring about a loss of
Fourth Amendment protection.
B. "Assumption of risk"
Even if a person exposes information or conduct to only a cho-
sen few, he has no Fourth Amendment complaint if one of his confi-
dants is, unbeknownst to him a police informer or undercover agent
who reports what he has seen and heard to the authorities. 26 "The
risk of being .. .betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the
identity of one with whom one deals is . . .the kind of risk we nec-
essarily assume whenever we speak. ' 27 Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment provides no protection to "a wrongdoer's misplaced be-
lief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it." 28
The "assumption of risk" limitation on Fourth Amendment
protection could seriously undermine individual privacy if the limi-
tation is applied in a "value-neutral" fashion. For example, Justice
Marshall has cautioned that "whether privacy expectations are legit-
imate within the meaning of Katz depend[s] . ..on the risks he
should be forced to assume in a free and open society . . . [C]ourts
must evaluate the 'intrinsic character' of investigative practices with
reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth Amendment. '29
A majority of the Court has conceded that in some situations, a
"normative inquiry" might be necessary." It should surprise no one
that the Court has on several occasions divided sharply when
pondering such issues.
II. THE CURTILAGE-OPEN FIELDS DICHOTOMY
The law recognizes several different categories of locations for
purposes of applying the Fourth Amendment. At one extreme is the
25. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
26. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
27. Id. at 303. Thus, when a drug dealer invites a customer into his home to sell
him drugs, he assumes the risk that the customer may really be an undercover police
officer; if such is the case, the mere fact that the officer or agent accepted the invita-
tion does not constitute a "search." Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
Hence, the dealer cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment to preclude the officer from
testifying as to what the defendant said or did in his presence. Id. Similarly, it is not
a search for one party to a conversation surreptitiously to record or transmit it with-
out the knowledge of the other party. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744
(1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
28. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
29. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Id., at 740-41 n.5 (majority opinion).
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home, which enjoys the greatest degree of protection.3 The "curti-
lage"32 of a home also enjoys substantial protection.33 At the other
extreme, public locations, including streets, sidewalks, parks, etc.,
are not afforded Fourth Amendment protection.34 Neither are "open
fields," 35 even if they are private property. 36 Business locations fall
somewhere in between these extremes, enjoying some Fourth
Amendment protection, but not as much as a home does.
37
Thus, the outcome in Fourth Amendment suppression litigation
often depends upon how a particular location is categorized (resi-
dence, curtilage, open field or business location). As the cases dis-
cussed herein will demonstrate, these issues have sharply divided
the Supreme Court.
A. Hester and Oliver
The Fourth Amendmentexplicitly protects "[tihe right of the
people to be secure, in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures . . ."I In 1924, in Hester
v. United States,39 the Court held, in Justice Holmes' opinion, that
"the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the
people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended
to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house
is as old as the common law."4 Thus, the fact that police officers
trespassed onto private land to examine a bottle of bootleg whiskey
where they had seen it thrown did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Sixty years later, in Oliver v. United States,"' the Court consid-
31. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986)
(privacy expectations most heightened in the area of the home); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) (warrantless home search presumed unreasonable);
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (absent exigent circumstances warrant-
less entries into the home-presumed unreasonable). Thus, if police unlawfully enter a
defendant's home, any evidence they see once they are inside will be tainted by the
unlawful entrance and therefore will be suppressed. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796, 804 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
32. See infra text accompanying note 51.
33. See infra notes 51-83 and accompanying text.
34. See supra text accompanying note 23.
35. See infra text accompanying note 50.
36. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
37. Recently, the Court has divided sharply on the degree to which Fourth
Amendment protection of business premises differs from the protection afforded a
home. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
38. Emphasis added. See supra text accompanying note 8 for full text of the
fourth amendment.
39. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
40. Id. at 59.
41. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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ered whether the Hester "open fields" doctrine survived the Katz
decision and its progeny. In Oliver, the Court decided two unrelated
cases, one arising in Kentucky and one in Maine, in which police
officers trespassed onto private, rural, undeveloped land to deter-
mine whether the owner was (as they suspected) cultivating mari-
juana. Justice Powell, writing for a six-member majority,42 con-
cluded that the "open fields" doctrine was still good law: "we
reaffirm today . . . that an individual may not legitimately demand
privacy for activities conducted in fields out of doors, except in the
area immediately surrounding the home."4
This result, the majority emphasized, is mandated by the lan-
guage and history of the Fourth Amendment: at the time the
amendment was added to the Constitution, real property was under-
stood to be quite distinct from a person, house, paper or effect (the
latter term including only personal property)." Moreover, the Court
insisted, such a result was entirely consistent with Katz:
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interfer-
ence or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the pri-
vacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in
open fields.46
The Court also pointed out that as a practical matter "these lands
usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a
home, an office, or commercial structure would not be,"4 because
fences and "no trespassing" signs do not effectively bar the public
from viewing open fields in rural areas.
Justice Powell's majority opinion conceded that the defendants
had sought to secure the privacy of their unlawful horticulture by
restricting it to areas remote from public roads, and by fencing and
posting no trespassing signs. The Court refused, however, to utilize a
case-by-case analysis to apply the Fourth Amendment to open
fields. To do so, the majority insisted, would introduce vast new ar-
eas of confusion into the law.47 Moreover, while the marijuana-
grower's precautions probably prevented members of the public
from stumbling upon the crops found by the police, this fact did not
make defendants' privacy expectations "legitimate" in Fourth
42. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Rehnquist, O'Connor and, in part, White. Justices Marshall, Brennan and Stevens
dissented.
43. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
44. Id. at 176-77.
45. Id. at 179. Justice White did not join this part of the opinion, reasoning that
the language and history of the amendment disposed of the issue without need to
discuss privacy expectations. Id. at 184.
46. Id. at 179.
47. Id. at 181-82.
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Amendment terms, because "a police inspection of open fields" does
not "infringe[] upon the personal and societal values protected by
the Fourth Amendment.""" And while the intrusion "is a trespass at
common law," property interests, though relevant to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, no longer "control the right of the Government to
search and seize."'49 Thus, the Court concluded that there had been
no Fourth Amendment violation.
In the course of explaining its conclusions, the Court offered at
least a partial definition of "open fields":
the term "open fields" may include any unoccupied or undeveloped
area outside the curtilage. An open field need be neither "open" nor a
"field" as those terms are used in common speech. For example,. . . a
thickly wooded area nonetheless may be an open field as that term is
used in construing the Fourth Amendment."
As Justice Homes did in Hester, Justice Powell in Oliver carefully
distinguished between open fields, unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment, and the "curtilage" of a house, which is protected.
Concerning curtilage, the Court observed:
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the inti-
mate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life," and therefore has been considered part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, the courts have ex-
tended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have
defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the fac-
tors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that
an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private."
The facts of the two cases before the Court in Oliver did not require
the Court to distinguish any more precisely than that between curti-
lage and open fields.
B. Back Yard as Curtilage: Ciraolo
In California v. Ciraolo,52 decided two years after Oliver, mari-
juana again fertilized the law of open fields and curtilage. Once
again, police officers received a tip concerning unlawful cultivation
- not, as in Oliver, in a remote rural area, but in the back yard of a
suburban home. Two fences, one of them ten feet high, prevented
observation from the ground. Two officers trained in marijuana de-
tection rented an airplane, flew over the yard, and saw marijuana
growing within the fenced-in area. Ciraolo subsequently sought to
48. Id. at 182-83.
49. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, quoting, Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, quoting, Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
50. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11.
51. Id. at 180, quoting, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1896).
52. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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suppress the information obtained during this flight.
In describing Ciraolo's fenced-in garden, Chief Justice Burger
cited to the Oliver discussion of curtilage, and continued:
The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of
families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the
home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations
are most heightened. The . . . area here was immediately adjacent to
a suburban home, surrounded by high double fences. This close nexus
to the home would appear to encompass this small area within the
curtilage ....
That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police
observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has
never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their
eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. 3
The majority concluded that the officers' location in publicly naviga-
ble airspace was the constitutional equivalent of a public thorough-
fare, and that the surveillance therefore did not constitute a
search." '
A few aspects of this passage merit comment. First, the Court's
observation, that a double-fenced suburban back yard "would ap-
pear" to be within the curtilage of the house, is somewhat begrudg-
ing. If this isn't curtilage, it is difficult to imagine anything without
a roof that ever would be.
Perhaps more significant; if a suburban homeowner does not
surround his back yard with an opaque ten-foot high fence, does this
deprive the yard of "curtilage" status? Ciraolo provides no clear an-
swer. The Court's most recent curtilage-open fields decision, United
States v. Dunn,5 does not address the question squarely, but pro-
vides clues which, if Delphic in nature, at least have the virtue of
elevating our uncertainty to a higher plane. Before considering
Dunn, it is necessary to examine a companion case to Ciraolo.
III. THE "INDUSTRIAL CURTILAGE" CONCEPT: Dow CHEMICAL V.
UNITED STATES
Dow Chemical v. United States56 was argued and decided the
same day as Ciraolo.57 The Environmental Protection Administra-
tion ("EPA") sought permission to conduct an on-site inspection of
a 2,000-acre chemical manufacturing facility operated by Dow in
Midland, Michigan. When Dow refused to consent to the inspection,
53. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-13.
54. Id. at 214.
55. 480 U.S. 294 (1987). See infra notes 88-145 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of this recent case.
56. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
57. The cases were argued on December 10, 1985 and decided on May 19, 1986.
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the EPA employed a commercial aerial photographer to photograph
the facility at altitudes ranging from 1,200 feet to 12,000 feet. Claim-
ing that the photographs might reveal valuable trade secrets it had
gone to considerable lengths to protect (particularly with regard to
several open-air plants), Dow sought an injunction in federal district
court.5 8 Dow alleged that the EPA's action constituted a search that
violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court agreed, and
granted the injunction. 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed,"0 and Dow appealed.
Thus Dow, like Ciraolo, poses questions concerning the applica-
bility of the Fourth Amendment to aerial surveillance. The cases
differ, however, in two significant respects. First, in Ciraolo, the sur-
veillance was conducted with the naked eye, while in Dow, it was
conducted with an aerial mapping camera that recorded on film far
more than an observer in the plane could have seen with the naked
eye. Thus, the surveillance in Dow was far more revealing than that
in Ciraolo.1 Second, while Ciraolo involved surveillance of the back
yard of a private home, Dow involved surveillance of a huge multi-
building industrial complex.
Dow's Fourth Amendment argument consisted, as all such
claims must, of two basic points: that it had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy with regard to the target of the surveillance, and that
the surveillance unlawfully violated that expectation. To support its
claim that it had a right to privacy from aerial photography, Dow
argued that the open spaces within the complex 2 constituted an
"industrial curtilage" protected by the Fourth Amendment. The
company pointed out that federal and state trade secret laws protect
Dow from unauthorized disclosure of the information in question.
By enacting such legislation, Dow reasoned, society had recognized
as "reasonable" the company's expectation of privacy from surveil-
lance that might disclose the information in question. Moreover,
Dow insisted, it had "done everything commercially feasible to pro-
tect the confidential business information and property located
58. Dow also argued that EPA lacked statutory authority to conduct the sur-
veillance. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld that authority. Because this arti-
cle focuses solely on Fourth Amendment issues, it does not analyze that aspect of the
Dow Chemical decision.
59. 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
60. 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
61. The Court's treatment of the photographic and technological aspects of Dow
are summarized briefly in note 76, infra:
62. The 2,000-acre complex contains numerous chemical processing plants, sev-
eral of which are "open-air" plants, with reactor equipment, loading and storage facil-
ities, motors, etc., located in the open area between buildings. Dow claimed that the
technology used in these plants are trade secrets protected by law, and that aerial
* photographs of the design and configuration of its open-air facilities could reveal de-
tails of its secret manufacturing processes. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 232.
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within the borders of the facility." 3 Entrance to the plant is strictly
regulated. An eight-foot high chain link fence completely surrounds
the facility. The fence is patrolled by security personnel, monitored
by closed-circuit television, motion detectors and other alarm sys-
tems. The open-air plants are placed within the internal portion of
the complex, to shield them from public view from outside the pe-
rimeter fence. Use of photographic equipment within the complex
by anyone other than authorized Dow personnel is prohibited, and
no photographs of the facility may be taken or released without
prior management review and approval. 4 Dow alleged to the district
court that all told, it had spent at least $3.25 million on various se-
curity measures in each of the ten years preceding the litigation.65 In
addition, Dow asserted that it had also taken strenuous measures
designed to protect it against aerial surveillance.66
The Court, dividing five to four, rejected Dow's claims. The ma-
jority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger,67 acknowledged that
commercial property, like residential property, is protected by the
fourth amendment from unreasonable searches and seizures.68 Con-
ceding that the outdoor portions of Dow's facilities were in some
respects analogous to the "curtilage" of a private home, the majority
pointed out that it was also analogous in many ways to an "open
63. Id., 476 U.S. at 241 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1365 (E.D. Mich.
1982).
66. As a matter of standard company practice, employees are instructed to note
the identification number of any "suspicious" overflights of the facility. When such
flights occur, the company locates the pilot to determine if he had photographed the
facility and (if so) requests the photographer to turn over the film. If the pilot com-
plies, Dow develops the film and reviews the photographs. If they reveal private busi-
ness information, Dow retains the photographs and negatives. If the pilot refuses to
cooperate, Dow commences litigation to protect its trade secrets. Dow, 476 U.S. at 242
n.3. Thus, Dow argued, it does all it reasonably could be expected to do to protect its
facility from aerial photography. The only other alternative would be to place a roof
over its open-air facilities. This, the company insisted, would be unreasonable for two
reasons. First, it would be prohibitively expensive: to roof just one such plant in 1978
would have cost approximately $15 million. Second, it would greatly increase the dan-
ger to employees if explosive or toxic chemicals were accidentally released. Id. at 241
n.1. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting). The majority concluded, however,
that these measures were insufficient to give Dow a reasonable expectation of privacy
against such photography. See infra note 79.
67. Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined chief Justice Bur-
ger. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, dissented
from the majority's Fourth Amendment analysis. Because these Justices agreed with
the majority's conclusion that (Fourth Amendment issues aside) the EPA has statu-
tory authority to conduct aerial surveillance (see supra note 58), Powell's opinion is
technically classified as "concurring in part and dissenting." Because this article fo-
cuses solely on Fourth Amendment issues, Powell's opinion is referred to hereafter
simply as the dissent.
68. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 235, citing, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978) and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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field."
The Chief Justice, quoting from Justice Powell's majority opin-
ion in Oliver, pointed out that the open areas in the Dow complex
"do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the
[Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from governmental in-
terference or surveillance. 6' Again quoting Oliver, Chief Justice
Burger likewise observed in Dow that "[t]o fall within the open
fields doctrine the area 'need be neither "open" nor a "field" as
those terms are used in common speech.' 170 Thus, "[t]he area at
issue here can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere between 'open
fields' and curtilage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics
of both. 71 The Court emphasized, however, that "[w]e find it im-
portant that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private
home where privacy expectations are most heightened. 12 Rather,
this was commercial property, which enjoys somewhat less Fourth
Amendment protection than an individual's home, "because 'the ex-
pectations of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys
in such property differs significantly from the sanctity afforded an
individual's home.'""
"Any actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed areas,"
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged, "would raise significantly differ-
ent questions, because 'the businessman, like the occupant of a resi-
dence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from
unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial prop-
erty.' "7" But this case, the Court stressed, "concerns aerial observa-
tion of a 2,000-acre outdoor manufacturing facility without physical
entry."" Moreover, despite the sophisticated nature of the photog-
69. Dow Chemical, 496 U.S. at 235, quoting, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
70. Id. at 236, quoting, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11. For the pertinent portion of
note 11 of Oliver, see supra note 49 and accompanying text. As both the majority and
dissent describe it, Dow's 2,000-acre site apparently bears little resemblance to an
"unoccupied or undeveloped ... or thickly wooded area."
71. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 236.
72. Id. at 237, n.4 (emphasis in the original).
73. Id. at 237-38, quoting, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981). The
majority also quoted the Court's comment in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
315 (1978) that "[wihat is observable by the public is observable without a warrant
by the Government inspector as well." Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238. It is a com-
ment that has at least arguable applicability to aerial surveillance from public
airspace.
Justice Powell, dissenting, accused the majority of grossly misrepresenting the
Court's prior decisions applying the Fourth Amendment to commercial premises. See
infra note 80 concerning Powell's dissent.
74. Id. at 237, quoting, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967). The
expression "enclosed area" is ambiguous: it could be taken to mean the entire Dow
complex, which, after all, is enclosed by a rather formidable fence and other security
measures (see supra text accompanying notes 63-64) or it might mean merely "within
a building inside the Dow complex."
75. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 (emphasis in original).
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raphy involved, the majority did not consider the surveillance to be
particularly intrusive.
76
Finally, the Court brushed aside the argument that the enact-
ment of trade secret laws constitutes a societal recognition of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy against aerial surveillance by govern-
ment agents. Such laws "may protect against use of photography by
competitors" who are trying to spy upon Dow's industrial secrets,
but these statutes do not "proscribe the use of aerial photography of
Dow's facilities for law enforcement purposes, let alone photography
for private purposes unrelated to competition such as map-making
or simple amateur snapshots." '
The Court therefore concluded that "the open areas of an in-
dustrial plant complex with numerous plant structures spread over
an area of 2,000 acres" is, for purposes of aerial surveillance and
photography from publicly navigable airspace, more analogous to an
open field than to a residential curtilage.78 Thus, such surveillance
and photography "is not a search prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.""9
Justice Powell, writing for the four dissenters,0 denounced
every aspect of the majority's Fourth Amendment analysis."s Of par-
76. The photographs were taken with a $22,000 aerial mapping camera mounted
onto the floor of an airplane; when enlarged, they revealed far more than the unaided
eye could have seen from the same height. In finding this constitutionally insignifi-
cant, the Court stressed that the EPA had not used "highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology," nor
"some unique sensory device" that could "penetrate the walls of buildings and record
conversations" that took place indoors. The Court acknowledged that-"serious pri-
vacy concerns" would be implicated if the photographs revealed "intimate details"
such as "a class ring, . . . identifiable human faces or secret documents," but empha-
sized that they revealed only a more detailed "outline of the facility's buildings and
equipment." Id. at 238-39. For a detailed discussion of this aspect of Dow Chemical,
see Fishman, Technologically Enhanced Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Sophistication, Availability and the Expectation of Privacy, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 315, 340-351 (1988).
77. Id. at 239 n.6.
78. Id. at 239. The Court noted that its holding does not reach issues that might
arise in the event of "actual physical entry" onto a so-called "business curtilage." Id.
n.7.
79. Id. at 239. The Court also dismissed Dow's anti-aerial surveillance proce-
dures (see supra note 65 and accompanying text) as being beneath serious discussion.
"Dow did not take any precautions against aerial intrusions .... " Id. at 237 n.4
(Court's emphasis). "Simply keeping track of the identification numbers of any
planes flying overhead, with a later followup to see if photographs were taken, does
not constitute a procedure designed to protect the facility from aerial photography."
Id. The majority did not respond directly to Dow's claim that no more protective
countermeasures were feasible. The holding in Dow nonetheless contains an unequiv-
ocal rejection of this claim. The cost of privacy from aerial surveillance of this sort,
the Court said silently but clearly, is a roof. If Dow was unwilling or unable to pay the
price, it would simply have to forgo the privacy.
80. See supra note 67 for details of the Court's split.
81. Part II of the dissent accused the majority of ignoring a long-established
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ticular interest here, Justice Powell ridiculed the majority's misuse
of the curtilage - open fields concepts, insisting, quite correctly,
that "the Dow facility resembles neither." 2 To compare the Dow
complex to a residential curtilage is specious, since "Dow makes no
argument that its privacy interests are equivalent to those in the
home." 3 The open fields analogy is equally irrelevant, because
"[olpen fields, as we held in Oliver, are places in which people do
not enjoy reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore are open
to warrantless inspections from ground and air alike." 4 Asserting
that the majority conceded that "Dow was constitutionally pro-
tected against warrantless intrusion by the Government on the
ground" - an assertion that somewhat overstates what the majority
in fact said85 - Justice Powell concluded that "The [Dow] complex
bears no resemblance to an open field either in fact or within the
meaning of our cases."8' 6
In essence, the dissent accuses the majority of using an inappro-
priate "either-or" approach to the situation - all unroofed property
is either residential curtilage or "open field" - to rationalize a re-
sult that it could not justify any other way. There is considerable
merit to this criticism. A location like the Dow complex was beyond
the experience and probably even beyond the imagination of genera-
tions of the judges who formulated the open fields-curtilage dichot-
omy, and of the founding fathers who drafted and ratified the
Fourth Amendment. Even the strictest of "strict constructionists"
principle that the Fourth Amendment protects commercial as well as residential
promises from warrantless searches. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 245. (See supra note
73 and accompanying text for the majority's treatment of the subject.) Protesting the
majority's assertion that the Court's prior decisions had in general given the govern-
ment "greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property,"
Justice Powell insisted that those prior decisions had recognized an exception to the
warrant requirement only with regard to "pervasively regulated businesses." Id. at
246 (cites omitted). A detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. Suffice it here to say that while the dissent perhaps gets the better of the skir-
mish, the majority's overstatement is not as egregious as the dissent claims. The ma-
jority simply appears to be making the point that since business premises have lesser
expectations of privacy in some respects than do private homes, in doubtful or uncer-
tain situations, analogies to residential curtilage simply may not merit constitutional
recognition.
The dissenting Justices accepted as valid Dow's argument that the existence of
trade secret laws supports the company's Fourth Amendment claims, Dow Chemical,
476 U.S. at 249, and rejected the majority's discussion of the technology issue. Id. at
251 (Powell, J., dissenting). These issues are beyond the scope of this article.
82. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 250 (Powell, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 250-51 (Powell, J., dissenting), citing, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180-81
(1984).
85. The majority merely observed that "physical entry ... into any enclosed
area would raise significantly different questions. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at
237. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 250 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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would be compelled to look beyond "original intent" to apply the
Fourth Amendment to such a location.
It is unfortunate that the Court insisted on drawing inapt anal-
ogies and waffled on the question whether the Dow complex would
be constitutionally protected from physical intrusion.s7 The facts
did not involve a ground-level intrusion, however, so there was no
absolute necessity that the Court rule on the implications of such an
intrusion.
IV. THE DICHOTOMY DRAMATIZED: United States v. Dunn
Less than a year after deciding Ciraolo and Dow, the Court, in
United States v. Dunn,8 returned to the curtilage - open fields
dichotomy. As in the Oliver cases and Ciraolo, the issue arose as a
result of the seizure of illicit drugs. In September of 1980, agents of
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) learned that a man
named Carpenter had ordered substantial quantities of chemicals
and equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and
phenylacetone. The agents obtained a court order authorizing the
placement of electronic tracking devices in the equipment and
chemical containers before Carpenter took possession of them. By
monitoring the beeper and conducting aerial surveillance,88 the
agents eventually traced the chemicals, equipment, and Carpenter's
pickup truck, which had transported some of these items, to a barn
behind the ranch house of defendant Dunn's 198-acre ranch."0
Acting without a warrant, on the evening of November 5, 1980,
a DEA agent and a Houston police officer walked onto Dunn's
ranch, crossed several fences, walked up to a barn, looked inside and
saw what the DEA agent believed was a phenylacetone laboratory.
At that time, the officers did not enter the barn. After two addi-
tional visits to the barn door the next day, they described what they
had seen in affidavits. A warrant was issued based on the affidavits
authorizing a search of the ranch. A few days later they executed the
warrant, and seized chemicals and equipment from the barn, along
with bags of methamphetamine from the ranch house.
Convicted of drug offenses, Dunn appealed the denial of his
pre-trial motion to suppress. He argued that the officers had com-
mitted an unlawful search by peering into his barn. This not only
tainted the search warrant, but also all of the evidence seized pursu-
87. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
89. The defendants apparently did not challenge the constitutionality of the use
of either beeper or aerial surveillance.
90. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297.
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ant to the warrant."1 Dunn further maintained that by looking into
the barn, the officers committed an unlawful search because it vio-
lated the privacy of his home and its curtilage, or violated his rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the barn itself. The case went on a
rather peripatetic appellate journey before the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals ultimately agreed with Dunn's first theory."2 The Supreme
Court reversed, ruling that the officers' actions prior to the execu-
91. If an unlawful search sets in motion a chain of events leading to the ulti-
mate discovery of evidence, that initial illegality may taint, i.e. require suppression of,
the evidence, even if the intervening steps were themselves lawful. See Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (unlawful entry into petitioner's home led to the
suppression in court of all narcotics obtained through an otherwise lawful seizure);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (unlawful entry into a suspect's home led to
the suppression of shell casing evidence connecting defendant to a homicide). See
generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4 (2d ed. 1987); Pitler, "The Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree Revisited and Shepardized," 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (1968).
92. The Fifth Circuit initially ruled that the barn was within the curtilage of
the residence, and that the warrantless entry into the curtilage was an unlawful
search. It therefore reversed Dunn's conviction. United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1982). (Carpenter's conviction, however, was left undisturbed, for reasons
explained in the second paragraph of this footnote.) The government appealed, and
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, and remanded it for further consideration
in light of Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). United States v. Dunn, 467
U.S. 1201 (1984). On remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its reversal of Dunn's con-
viction, albeit on a somewhat different basis: this time the circuit court concluded
that although the large barn was not within the curtilage of the residence, peering
into the barn violated Dunn's expectation of privacy into the barn itself. United
States v. Dunn, 766 F.2d 880, 886 (5th Cir. 1985). The government again applied for
certiorari, but before the Supreme Court acted on the petition, the Fifth Circuit re-
called and vacated its judgment, stating that it would enter a new judgment in due
course. United States v. Dunn, 781 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1985). Finally, the circuit court
reinstated the original decision rendered in 1982, concluding that "[ulpon studied
reflection, we now conclude and hold that the barn was inside the protected curti-
lage." United States v. Dunn, 782 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986).
Throughout the appellate process, the only significant issue was whether there
had been a violation of Dunn's Fourth Amendment rights. Carpenter, the co-defend-
ant, did not live at Dunn's ranch and had no other privacy interest there. Thus, even
if the search violated Dunn's privacy, it did not violate any of Carpenter's rights. It is
a well-established principle that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights
which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). If a search unlawfully intrudes upon
the reasonable expectations of privacy of defendant "X" but does not intrude upon
the reasonable expectations of privacy of defendant "Y," then evidence obtained as a
result of that search is inadmissible against X but is admissible against Y, since Y
lacks "standing" to challenge the legality of the search in the first place. Id. "Co-
conspirators and co-defendants [are] accorded no special standing." Id. at 172. Nine
years after Alderman, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court explicitly endorsed the reasoning
and result in Alderman, although eschewing the use of the term "standing" in favor
of a more direct examination of whether, on a defendant-by-defendant basis, the in-
vestigative technique in question intruded into that defendant's fourth amendment-
protected privacy. 439 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1978). For a concise discussion of "standing"
and the related topics of "poisonous trees," "tainted fruit," and "taint aversion," see
Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo,
and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277, 347-54 (1985). For an
exhaustive treatment of these topics, see 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 11.3 -
11.4 (2d ed. 1987).
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tion of the search warrant did not constitute a search.
To fully appreciate the Supreme Court decision and its implica-
tions, detailed descriptions of the physical layout of Dunn's ranch,
the area in the immediate vicinity of the barn, and how the officers
got there are necessary." Dunn's 198-acre ranch was completely en-
circled by a perimeter fence, and contained several interior fences,
constructed mainly of posts and multiple strands of barbed wire. 4
Neither the farmhouse nor its outbuildings were visible from the
public road or from the fence that encircled the entire property.
They were located in a clearing surrounded by woods, one-half mile
from a road, down a chained, locked driveway. 5 The residence and a
nearby small greenhouse were encircled by yet another fence. Thus,
access to Dunn's property was not easy. 6
The agents entered the ranch by crossing over the perimeter
fence, then over a second, interior fence.97 From approximately mid-
way between the residence and the barns, the DEA agents smelled
an odor which they believed to be phenylacetic acid coming from the
direction of the barns.99 They then crossed over a barbed wire fence,
looked into the smaller barn (which contained only empty boxes),
and proceeded to the larger barn, crossing yet another barbed wire
fence to do so." Unable to see through the larger barn's solidly built
back and sides,100 they climbed over a wooden fence that enclosed
the front portion of the barn and walked under the overhang.' En-
trance to the barn itself was barred by locked, waist-high gates. Net-
ting material was stretched from the ceiling of the barn to the top of
wooden gates.'0° Shining a flashlight through the netting, the officers
peered into the barn. It was this observation by flashlight which be-
came the basis for the officers' search warrant.103
A. Dunn's Barn as Non-Curtilage
Justice White, joined by six other justices, concluded that no
intrusion upon Dunn's Fourth Amendment rights had occurred prior
93. The circuit court provided a sketch of the area as an appendix to one of its
opinions. Dunn, 782 F.2d 1226, 1228 (5th Cir. 1986) (attached hereto as appendix A).
94. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297.
95. Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 297 (majority opinion by Justice White). See infra notes 101-02 and
accompanying text for further description of the area.
97. Id. at 297. Apparently this second "interior" fence is the "substantial" fence
referred to in the text corresponding to note 95, supra. It was at this point that the
agents could smell the laboratory.
98. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 298, 307.
102. Id. at 297.
103. Id. at 298.
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to the execution of the search warrant.
The Court began its analysis by reciting the holdings in Hester
and Oliver, and reiterated that in determining whether a particular
area constitutes curtilage, the inquiry centers on whether the area
harbors the "intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life.' "104 Such questions, the Court
instructed:
should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the prox-
imity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature
of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resi-
dent to protect the area from observation by people passing by.'05
Applying these factors, the Court concluded that none of them
supported including the barn within the curtilage of Dunn's ranch
house. First, the barn was fifty yards from the fence surrounding the
house, and sixty yards from the house itself.106 Second, the barn did
not lie within the perimeter of the fence around the house.10 7 Third,
the officers "possessed objective data indicating that the barn was
not being used for intimate activities of the home 1 0 8 - information
from the beepers and aerial photographs, and the odor of pheny-
lacetic acid and the sound of a motor that grew stronger the closer
the officers came to the barn. 109 Finally, respondent failed to protect
the barn area from open field observation; the various fences on
Dunn's property were "typical ranch . . . fences . . . designed and
constructed to corral livestock, not to prevent persons from observ-
ing what lay inside the enclosed area."'10
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, rejecting every aspect
of the majority opinion. First of all the four-part analysis "overlooks
the role a barn plays in rural life and ignores extensive authority
104. Id. at 300, citing, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, quoting, Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
105. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. The Court conceded that combining these factors
would not produce "a finely tuned formula" that could by applied mechanically to
produce a "correct" answer to all "extent-of-curtilage questions." Id.
106. Id. at 302.
107. Id. The Court explicitly rejected the government's suggestion that the
Court adopt a "bright line rule" that the curtilage extend no further than the nearest
fence surrounding a fenced house. Id. at 301 n.4.
108. Id. at 302. Justice Scalia joined Justice White's majority opinion except for
the latter's discussion of the use of the barn. Id. at 305 (Scalia, J., concurring). In
determining whether the barn was within the curtilage of the residence, Justice Scalia
argued that what is significant is whether the barn in fact was being used for domes-
tic or non-domestic purposes. Id. "The officers' perceptions might be relevant to
whether the intrusion upon curtilage was nonetheless reasonable," Justice Scalia con-
cluded, "but they are no more relevant to whether the barn was curtilage than to
whether the house was a house." Id.
109. Id. at 302-03.
110. Id.
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holding that a barn, when clustered with other out-buildings near
the residence, is part of the curtilage.""' Moreover, even assuming
the Court's four-part test was valid, the Court had misapplied it.
First, Justice Brennan asserted, the sixty-yard distance between
house and barn is insignificant: many lower court decisions had held
barns farther than that from the ranch-or-farm house to be within
the curtilage of the house." 2 Second, the configuration of fences
around the house is irrelevant, particularly since the barn was "clus-
tered with the farmhouse and other outbuildings in a clearing sur-
rounded by woods," and was connected to the house by a "'well-
walked' and a 'well-driven' path."' 3
The Court's third factor - "the nature of the uses to which the
area is put" - is, according to Justice Brennan, inconsistent with
the Oliver majority's approach to privacy expectations. The Oliver
Court, eschewing a particularized examination of how the field at
issue in any given case was in fact used, had simply enunciated a
general rule that no legitimate expectations of privacy can exist in
open fields."' Thus, Brennan reasoned, the Court should employ the
same level of generality in deciding how a barn should be classified:
since most barns are curtilage, all barns, including Dunn's, should be
regarded as curtilage." 5
Finally, Justice Brennan described as astounding the Court's as-
sertion that Dunn "did little to protect the barn area from observa-
tion of those standing in the open fields.""' On the contrary, he
maintained Dunn had done all he reasonably could have to prevent
uninvited visitors from even seeing the barn: fencing around the en-
tire property, additional fencing within the ranch, and positioning
111. Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited twelve state
cases, from Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon and
Texas, and six federal cases, from the First, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and district
courts in Maryland and Mississippi, in support of his assertion. Id. at 308-09.
112. Id. at 309. Several of the cases cited by Justice Brennan, supra n.111, so
held.
113. Id. at 309-10.
114. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 n.10, 181. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying
text.
115. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned
that even if a home were used as a drug laboratory, it would still be protected by the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches; the same should be true, there-
fore, of a barn near a rural residence. Id. at 311. Justice Brennan complained that
"[tihe Court's willingness to generalize about the absence of a privacy interest in the
open fields and unwillingness to generalize about the existence of a privacy interest in
a barn near a residence are manifestly inconsistent and reflect a hostility to the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 310. Moreover, he insisted, the officers
learned about the laboratory (by detecting the aroma of phenylacetic acid) only after
they were in the "area between the barns and the farmhouse," an area which, he
insisted, "is itself part of the curtilage" of the home. Id. at 311.
116. Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 22:795
Police Tresspass and the Fourth Amendment
the barn out of sight from the ranch's perimeter" 7 Beyond that,
Dunn had also taken elaborate measures to shield the inside of the
barn from all unwelcome views: the solid construction of its back
and sides, the wooden fence across its front, the inner waist-high
fence with locked wooden gates, and the fish-net material that cov-
ered the opening from the gates to the roof."' Even a few feet away
from the netting, Justice Brennan stressed, it was impossible to see
inside." '9 "The Fourth Amendment," Justice Brennan observed sar-
castically, "does not require the posting of a 24-hour guard to pre-
serve an expectation of privacy."'
Perhaps Justice Brennan is correct. Perhaps the majority opin-
ion "reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the typical role of a
barn in rural domestic life."'' Never having lived on a farm, I am in
no position to evaluate this point, although to maintain, as Brennan
apparently does, that all barns located within sight of a ranch or
farm house should be considered as within the residential curtilage,
regardless of the distance between them and regardless of the use to
which the barn is put, seems a substantial over-generalization. 22
Assuming, therefore, that it is appropriate to examine the par-
ticular circumstances of a case to determine whether an out-building
is within the curtilage of a home, the majority's four-factor test
seems rational enough. 3 While there is validity to Justice Bren-
nan's criticism of the majority's application of that test to the facts
in Dunn, particularly with regard to its treatment of Dunn's efforts
to protect the barn from surveillance,' 2 ' the majority's opinion is
stronger. Dunn's barn was sixty yards and a fence or two away from
his home. Even before entering Dunn's ranch, the officers had rea-
son to believe the barn was being used to store chemical equip-
ment." 5 As they approached the barn itself, they could detect a
strong chemical aroma emanating from it. Although Dunn did pro-
tect it from unwelcome viewing, the barn simply does not seem to be
a place "intimately linked to the home, both physically and psycho-
117. Id. at 306.
118. Id. at 312.
119. Id. at 312, citing, United States v. Dunn, 766 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1985).
120. Dunn,'480 U.S. at 312.
121. Id. at 312.
122. It is not necessarily inconsistent to conclude that all "unoccupied or unde-
veloped areas" (Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11), should be treated the same for Fourth
Amendment purposes, yet also conclude that barns should be classified on a case-by-
case basis for the same purpose.
123. Applied in different factual settings, however, the test has significant
shortcomings. See infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 109 (majority opinion) and 116-18 and accompanying text
(dissent).
125. This conclusion is certainly supported by the beeper and aerial surveil-
lance. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
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logically, where privacy expectations are most heightened"; 12 6 and
therefore is not a place "to which extends the intimate activity asso-
ciated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' 1 7
Dunn's barn was not functionally a part of his home; thus it would
have been illogical to treat it as such for Fourth Amendment
purposes.'
B. Barn Doorway as Open Field
Having disposed of Dunn's curtilage argument, the Court pro-
ceeded to examine Dunn's second theory. Dunn argued that he had
a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the barn be-
cause it was an essential part of his business. 29 The Court assumed
for the sake of argument that Dunn's barn enjoyed Fourth Amend-
ment protection and could not be subjected to a search and seizure
without a warrant.'2 0 Nevertheless, the Court concluded, the officers'
conduct did not violate the fourth amendment. It purported to base
this conclusion squarely on Oliver v. United States.'
Once again the Court began its analysis by repeating the Hes-
ter-Oliver holdings stating that since an open field is neither a house
nor an effect, a police intrusion into an open field "is not one of
those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text of Fourth
Amendment,"' 2 and that "the erection of fences on an open field -
at least of the variety involved in those cases and the present case"
- does not create a "constitutionally protected privacy interest."' 32
The Court then quoted the first two sentences of the Oliver semi-
definition of "open field": "[T]he term 'open fields' may include any
unoccupied or underdeveloped area outside the curtilage. An open
field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in
common speech.' 34
126. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
127. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
128. It is true that homeowners often use chemicals or machines in their houses,
basements, garages or apartments, and that this does not strip the home of its Fourth
Amendment protection as a home. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The issue in Dunn, 480 U.S. at 296, however, is whether a structure some fifty yards
from the home was so intimately associated with a home and the privacies of domes-
tic life that it should be considered a part of the home for Fourth Amendment
purposes.
129. Concerning the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to business
locations, see supra notes 73 and 80 and accompanying text.
130. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303.
131. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
132. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 303-04, quoting, Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
133. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304.
134. Id., quoting, Oliver, 466 U.S. 180 n.11). The sentence immediately follow-
ing the quoted passage in Oliver reads: "For example . . . a thickly wooded area
nonetheless may be an open field as that term is used in construing the Fourth
Amendment." Oliver, 466 U.S. 180 n.11. The Dunn majority did not quote this
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Immediately after quoting Oliver, the Dunn opinion continues:
It follows that no constitutional violation occurred here when the of-
ficers crossed over respondent's ranch-style perimeter fence, and over
several similarly constructed interior fences, prior to stopping at the
locked front gate of the barn. . . .Once at their vantage point, they
merely stood, outside the curtilage of the house and in the open fields
upon which the barn was constructed, and peered into the barn's open
front. And, standing as they were in the open fields, the Constitution
did not forbid them to observe the phenylacetone laboratory located
in respondent's barn. This conclusion flows naturally from our previ-
ous decisions."3 5
"It follows?" ". . . flows naturally?" Oliver says that any "un-
occupied or undeveloped area outside the curtilage" can be an
"open field" for Fourth Amendment purposes. The officers in Dunn
were standing within a multiply-fenced area in a well-defined clear-
ing in a wood which contained two well-maintained and apparently
frequently used barns. The barns were located within sixty yards of
a ranch house and other structures and connected to the house by a
"well-walked" and "well-driven" path." 6 They had climbed over a
wooden fence that enclosed the front end of the barn and were
standing beneath the overhang of the barn at the locked, waist-high
gate with their noses virtually pressed against the netting.
3 7
It follows that the officers were standing in an open field, as
that term was defined in Oliver, only if their location can be de-
scribed as an "unoccupied or undeveloped area." This flows from
Oliver about as naturally as water flows uphill. Or, to put it differ-
ently, the Court's conclusion 38 flows from Oliver only if all outdoors
areas must be classified as either the curtilage of a residence or an
open field, with no other categories being recognized as constitution-
ally significant. 39
C. Surveillance of Private Premises from "Open Fields"
The Dunn Court continued:
Under Oliver and Hester, there is no constitutional difference be-
tween police observations conducted while in a public place and while
standing in the open fields. Similarly, the fact that the objects ob-
served by the officers lay within an area that we have assumed, but
sentence.
135. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304.
136. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 306-09 for a full description of the premises.
137. Id. at 298, n.1.
138. Specifically, the lower court in Dunn concluded that the agents' actions
"did not invade the premises." Id.
139. Such a challenge occurred in Dow Chemical v. United States, where the
concept of industrial curtilage was discussed. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). See supra text
accompanying notes 62-74.
19891
The John Marshall Law Review
not decided, was protected by the Fourth Amendment does not affect
our decision . . . . [Tihe Fourth Amendment "has never been ex-
tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares." '
In other words, so long as the police have secured an observation
point that does not violate the Fourth Amendment (even if it does
involve trespass onto private land), they may look anywhere they
wish - not only into a barn or other commercial premises, but also,
as the final sentence of this passage makes clear, into a home. In-
deed, it appears that the officers could have permanently ensconced
themselves just outside the fence that surrounded the ranch, and
from that vantage point could have conducted round-the-clock sur-
veillance of home and barns, without giving rise to any Fourth
Amendment issues.
141
As a result of Dunn, the "open fields" doctrine can be summa-
rized in the following manner. First, it is not a search for police of-
ficers to trespass onto an open field to look for evidence, even if that
field is fenced and posted. 4 2 Second, it is not a search for police
officers to position themselves in an open field to peer inside a pri-
vate business or residential building, so long as they don't physically
enter the structure. 43 Third, an area qualifies as an "open field"
even if it is neither "open" nor a "field," so long as it is an "unoccu-
pied and undeveloped area.""' Finally, an area may qualify as an
"unoccupied and undeveloped area" even if it is both "occupied"
and "developed."'4 5
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Dunn decision has implications far beyond its application
to rural property and barns. It may diminish the privacy afforded to
commercial, industrial, and residential property as well.
140. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304, quoting, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207, 213.
141. To do so probably would, however, constitute a "taking" of Dunn's prop-
erty without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
142. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 n.13 (1984).
143. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304.
144. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.il.
145. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304. See supra text accompanying notes 129-136.
It is also noteworthy that the agents did not merely look into the barn; they used
a flashlight to enable them to see its contents. The Court commented that "the of-
ficers' use of the beam of a flashlight, directed through the essentially open front of
respondent's barn, did not transform their observations into an unreasonable search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 305, citing, Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983). The citation to Brown is not necessarily apt: that
case involved use of a flashlight to illumine the passenger compartment of a car
stopped on a public street, an area that does not enjoy Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, whereas the Court assumed that Dunn's barn did enjoy such protection.
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A. Dow and Dunn: a Comparison
The dissenters in Dow Chemical (Justices Powell, Blackmun,
Brennan and Marshall) took it as given that "Dow was constitution-
ally protected against warrantless intrusion by the Government on
the ground. '"1 4 The Dow Chemical majority did not go quite so far,
observing only that "[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into any
enclosed area would raise significantly different questions ....
Courts inevitably will confront cases that present facts falling some-
where in between Dow Chemical and Dunn. Assuming Dow Chemi-
cal's entire 2,000-acre facility is in fact protected from ground-level
intrusion, while Dunn's ranch, as the Court held, is not, it is worth-
while to briefly compare the two cases in an effort to predict which
aspects of each case are likely to be most significant.
There are similarities. In each case, the entire perimeter of the
property was fenced in a way that, at the very least, might be ex-
pected to discourage uninvited visitors. In each case, the actual en-
trance onto the property was barred except to carefully screened in-
vitees. In each case, the buildings that were the object of official
attention were not visible from the perimeter of the property. "
Since such similarities were not sufficient to bring Dunn within the
protection from ground-level intrusion that Dow Chemical presuma-
bly enjoys, "1 9 the question becomes; what are the factual differences
between the two locations that explain the different results?
Dow's facility is ten times the size of Dunn's ranch, but it is
hard to see how this would explain the different treatment. If size is
a factor at all, logically one would expect it to be a negative factor,
not a positive one. Dow's facility employed many more personnel
than Dunn's ranch, but again, this fact would tend to diminish
rather than enhance Dow's claim of protection against warrantless
ground-level intrusion. Dow's facility is industrial, rather than rural/
agricultural like Dunn's, but it is unclear why the Fourth Amend-
ment should favor an outdoor industrial complex over an outdoor
agricultural location.
Assuming none of these distinctions explain the presumably dif-
ferent results, what we are left with is the difference between the
146. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 251. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text.
147. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237. This aspect of Dow is discussed supra at
notes 74 and 85 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 59 and 85 and accompanying text.
149. It's worth noting that Powell and Blackmun, two of the Dow dissenters
who state unequivocally that Dow would enjoy Fourth Amendment protection against
warrantless physical intrusion on the ground, were among the seven judges in Dunn
who concluded that Dunn's ranch, indeed his barnyard, did not enjoy such
protection.
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security measures which Dow and Dunn took to prevent ground-
level intrusion. Dow's eight-feet high chain link perimeter fence was
much more imposing than Dunn's two-or-three strand barbed wire
fence; EPA agents might have had to cut a hole in the Dow fence,
rather than merely climb over it, as did the agents in Dunn. In addi-
tion, the Dow fence was patrolled by security personnel, and was
monitored by a variety of electronic systems as well,1 50 while Dunn's
ranch was not (so far as we know) patrolled or monitored by so
much as a watchdog. If indeed the Fourth Amendment protects the
Dow facility from unauthorized physical entry, the only conclusion
that can be stated with any certainty is that constitutional protec-
tion against nonconsensual and non-court authorized entry onto
large tracts of land is rather expensive.15
B. The End of "Commercial Curtilage?"
As we have just seen, Dunn holds that a fenced-in and well-
used barnyard is for Fourth Amendment purposes an "unoccupied
or undeveloped area outside the curtilage" of a home, and therefore,
in constitutional terms, an "open field." But the decision goes fur-
ther because the officers didn't merely stand in the barnyard. To
observe what they came to see, they had to climb over a wooden
fence that enclosed the front portion of the barn, walk under the
barn's overhang, and stand "right at" the waist-high wooden gate to
peer through the netting.1 52
As described in the various reported opinions, the area between
the wooden fence and the wooden gate would seem to have the same
relationship to the barn as, for example, a garage or shed has to a
private residence which it is near, or to which it is attached. Since
the latter structures presumably are within the curtilage of the
house,' if the concept of industrial or commercial curtilage has any
constitutional validity, the fenced-in, partially overhung area in
front of the barn should likewise qualify as being within the curti-
lage of the barn - a cognizable curtilage that enjoys Fourth Amend-
ment protection similar to that enjoyed by a residential curtilage.
The Dunn majority makes no explicit mention of the commer-
cial or industrial curtilage concept.5 4 It nonetheless appears that
the concept has been Dunn away with. 55
150. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
152. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 311 n.1.
153. Even the Dunn majority's four-factor analysis would appear to so hold.
154. The dissent contains a passing reference. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 318, n.11
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Or, if the reader prefers, such litigation may be no more than an attempt
to lock the barn after the door's been stolen. In Comm. v. Lutz, 512 Pa. 192, 516 A.2d
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C. On "Privacy" and "Intimacy": Back Yard as Curtilage,
Revisited
In discussing curtilage, the Court has consistently used the
terms "intimacy" and "privacy." In Ciraolo, for example, the Court
commented that "[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is essen-
tially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area inti-
mately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically,
where privacy expectations are most heightened.""' The front or
back yard of a private residence is "intimately linked to the home,"
however, without necessarily being entirely "private." Is it curtilage,
or not?
The back yard in Ciraolo v. California "was immediately adja-
cent to a suburban home [and] surrounded by high double fences.
This close nexus to the home," the Court observed, "would appear
to encompass this small area within the curtilage."I'l It is not en-
tirely clear whether the yard's "close nexus to the home" suffices, or
whether its "apparent" status as curtilage depends upon "nexus"
plus "high double fences." If the latter, Ciraolo provides little com-
fort to the vast majority of homeowners who do not surround their
yards with even one ten-foot-high fence.
In United States v. Dunn, " the Court listed four factors to be
considered in determining curtilage status:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the
nature of the uses to which the area is. put, and the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.' "
These factors do not mechanically yield a
'correct' answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, they are
useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they
bear upon the centrally relevant consideration: whether the area in
question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be
339 (1986), for example, the state supreme court, in a decision rendered prior to
Dunn, relied on Oliver to rule that state inspectors had acted improperly when, pro-
ceeding without a warrant, they intruded upon respondent's outdoor commercial
property to investigate whether he was complying with the state's waste management
laws. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the
case "for further consideration in light of United States v. Dunn." Pennsylvania v.
Lutz, 480 U.S. 927 (1987).
156. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213. Similarly, in Oliver, the Court spoke of curtilage
as an area so "closely associated with the home" that it harbors "intimate activity
associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' " Oliver, 466
U.S. at 180 (quoting United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). This passage
from Oliver is in turn quoted in Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (1987).
157. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. As noted earlier, the Court's use of the phrase
"would appear" is rather begrudging. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
158. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
159. Id.
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placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment
protection.'
It is possible to apply these factors to a typical suburban home. The
front yard is not fenced in at all. The back yard is surrounded by a
picket or cyclone fence only five feet high. A passer-by can see over
or through it without difficulty. Its gate latches but does not lock.
The gate may be imposing enough to keep children and pets in or
out, but the homeowner does not put up such a fence to physically
prevent adults from entering,161 but instead, simply because "good
fences make good neighbors."162 People erect such fences for much
the same reason that a wolf "marks" its territory with its scent, to
give warning that crossing the line is socially offensive.
Clearly such a homeowner has no Fourth Amendment com-
plaint if police officers position themselves on a nearby sidewalk or
roadway and watch or photograph what he does inside the yard. The
officers are not and should not be .obliged "to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.""16 But does this de-
prive the yard of curtilage status altogether? The question is impor-
tant, because if the yard is not curtilage, it is apparently an "open
field""' - in which case, Dunn holds, the police apparently can po-
sition themselves in the yard to watch or listen to conduct occurring
in the home. 6 '
Thus, applying the Dunn factors, one may conclude the
following:
(1) Proximity to the residence. These are areas "intimately tied
to"6  and "immediately surrounding the home,' 61 s 7 both of which
weigh strongly in favor of "curtilage" status.
(2) Configuration of fences. In Dunn the Court observed that
"the fence surrounding the residence [on Dunn's ranch] serves to
demarcate a specific area of land immediately adjacent to the house
that is readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house."'6 8 Pre-
sumably, the area within this fence is indeed curtilage. Since this
fence was not of Ciraolo-like proportions," the clear implication is
160. Id.
161. Some adults may have an implicit license to enter, for example, meter
readers and trash collectors (in communities that do not require the homeowner to
carry the trash to the curb).
162. R. FROST, supra note 1, at 48.
163. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
164. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text, and text immediately fol-
lowing note 86, supra.
165. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
167. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
168. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302.
169. See People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1086, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94
(1984) (defendant had two fences, of six feet and ten feet in height).
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that a front or back yard can gain a substantial number of "curtilage
points" even if enclosed by a fence that imposes only a symbolic, not
a physical, obstacle to a would-be trespasser. If the yard lacks such a
fence, on the other hand, does this subtract from its "curtilage
quotient"?
(3) Use of the area. The typical back and front yards are "used
for intimate activities of the home."' 70 Homeowners relax in the sun
or shade, watch their young children run under the sprinkler, stoke
up on carcinogens over the barbecue, and reenact our simpler, pas-
toral past as they water and weed, prune and hoe, rake and seed,
mulch and mow. But these activities, while "intimately tied to the
home,''7 are not necessarily "private," at least in terms of the
fourth factor:
(4) Privacy-protective measures. The typical home owner does
little to protect what he or she does in his or her yard from being
seen from the street, sidewalk, a neighbor's window, and so on. This
brings us back to the original question: does the lack of an imposing
fence entitle the police to trespass in the yard, free of Fourth
Amendment restraints, to observe (or overhear) what is going on in-
side the house, as the agents in Dunn trespassed in the barnyard to
see what was inside the barn? Even after applying the Dunn test,
there is no clear answer.
There is nothing inherently wrong with the four-factor test
enunciated in Dunn.1 7 1 It is incomplete, however, because it is too
value-neutral. An officer who walks across a front lawn or enters a
back yard to peer into a window (with or without flashlight) has in-
truded upon the resident's legitimate expectation of privacy, and
therefore has conducted a "search" subject to Fourth Amendment
restraints, not simply because he has trespassed, but because using
someone's back yard or lawn to spy on what he has, does, or says
inside his house violates "understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society. '17 3
The Dunn test does not explicitly include such "understand-
ings" as relevant considerations; and for this reason that test is in-
complete and potentially dangerous.
VI. CONCLUSION
Four times between 1983 and 1987, the Supreme Court has con-
sidered whether police entry onto private land constitutes a Fourth
170. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302.
171. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
173. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12. See also supra notes 20-21
and accompanying text.
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Amendment search. The locations in the four cases differed widely:
a field far from any structure (Oliver), a 2,000-acre industrial com-
plex (Dow), a suburban back yard (Ciraolo) and the entranceway to
a barn (Dunn). In none of these cases did the Court state unequivo-
cally that an unwelcome physical entry would be a search.174
Oliver v. United States reaffirms that under the "open fields"
doctrine, it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to
trespass on "unoccupied and undeveloped" private property, even if
it is fenced and posted, to look for incriminating evidence. 17 In so
holding, the Court appropriately applied established Fourth Amend-
ment principles. Dow and Ciraolo involved aerial surveillance, rather
than physical intrusion, but nevertheless raised unsettling questions
about physical entry. Dow leaves uncertainty as to what kind of out-
door commercial property (if any) enjoys Fourth Amendment pro-
tection from police trespass, and what kind of fence is needed to
afford it that protection. Ciraolo raises similar questions with regard
to a suburban back yard.
In Dunn, the Court did more than raise questions concerning
outdoor property and the Fourth Amendment; it provided at least
partial answers. Dunn classified as "unoccupied and undeveloped"
(and hence as "open field") an area which appears to be neither.176
Moreover, Dunn explicitly states that it is not a Fourth Amendment
search for an officer to peer inside a business location or residence
while trespassing in the suspect's "open field.' 77 Taken to its logical
extreme, this would empower the police to use a person's own back
yard as a surreptitious watching and listening post, free of any con-
stitutional restraints. While it is doubtful the Court will ever go that
far, the decision nonetheless has dangerous implications for com-
mercial, industrial, and even residential privacy. The wall needs
mending.
174. The closest the Court came was its acknowledgement that Ciraolo's back-
yard, surrounded by opaque double fences (one of which was ten feet high), "would
appear [to be] within the curtilage [of the residence]." Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
175. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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